Tag Archives: foreign policy

Palestine 2012 — Gaza and the UN resolution

Noam Chomsky
chomsky.info
December 1, 2012

An old man in Gaza held a placard that reads: “You take my water, burn my olive trees, destroy my house, take my job, steal my land, imprison my father, kill my mother, bombard my country, starve us all, humiliate us all but I am to blame: I shot a rocket back.” [1]

The old man’s message provides the proper context for the timelines on the latest episode in the savage punishment of Gaza. They are useful, but any effort to establish a “beginning” cannot help but be misleading. The crimes trace back to 1948, when hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled in terror or were expelled to Gaza by conquering Israeli forces, who continued to truck them over the border for years after the official cease-fire. The persecution of Gazans took new forms when Israel conquered the Strip in 1967. From recent Israeli scholarship we learn that the goal of the government was to drive the refugees into the Sinai, and if feasible the rest of the population too.

Expulsions from Gaza were carried out under the direct orders of General Yeshayahu Gavish, commander of the Southern Command. Expulsions from the West Bank were far more extreme, and Israel resorted to devious means to prevent the return of those expelled, in direct violation of Security Council orders. The reasons were made clear in internal discussion immediately after the war. Golda Meir, later Prime Minister, informed her Labor colleagues that Israel should keep the Gaza Strip while “getting rid of its Arabs.” Defense Minister Dayan and others agreed. Prime Minister Eshkol explained that those expelled cannot be allowed to return because “We cannot increase the Arab population in Israel” — referring to the newly occupied territories, already tacitly considered part of Israel. In accord with this conception, all of Israel’s maps were changed, expunging the Green Line (the internationally recognized borders), though publication was delayed to permit UN Ambassador Abba Eban to attain what he called “favorable impasse” at the General Assembly, by concealing Israel’s intentions. [2]

The goals may remain alive, and might be a factor contributing to Egypt’s reluctance to open the border to free passage of people and goods barred by the US-backed Israeli siege.

The current upsurge of US-Israeli violence dates to January 2006, when Palestinians voted “the wrong way” in the first free election in the Arab world. Israel and the US reacted at once with harsh punishment of the miscreants, and preparation of a military coup to overthrow the elected government, routine procedure. The punishment was radically intensified in 2007, when the coup attempt was beaten back, and the elected Hamas government established full control over Gaza.

The standard version of these events is more anodyne, for example, in the New York Times, November 29: “Hamas entered politics by running in, and winning, elections in the Palestinian territories in 2006. But it was unable to govern in the face of Western opposition and in 2007 took power in the Gaza Strip by force, deepening the political split [with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority].” [3]

Ignoring immediate Hamas offers of a truce after the 2006 election, Israel launched attacks that killed 660 Palestinians in 2006, mostly civilians, one-third minors. The escalation of attacks in 2007 killed 816 Palestinians, 360 civilians and 152 minors. The UN reports that 2879 Palestinians were killed by Israeli fire from April 2006 through July 2012, along with several dozen Israelis killed by fire from Gaza. [4]

A truce in 2008 was honored by Hamas until Israel broke it in November. Ignoring further truce offers, Israel launched the murderous Cast Lead operation in December. So matters have continued, while the US and Israel also continue to reject Hamas calls for a long-term truce and a political settlement in accord with the international consensus on a two-state settlement that the US has blocked since 1976, when the US vetoed a Security Council resolution to this effect, brought by the major Arab states.

In late 2012 the US devoted extensive efforts to block a General Assembly resolution upgrading Palestine’s status to that of a “non-member observer state.” The effort failed, leaving the US in its usual international isolation on November 29, when the resolution passed overwhelmingly on the anniversary of the 1947 General Assembly vote on partition. [5] The reasons Washington frankly offered for its opposition to the resolution were revealing: Palestine might approach the International Criminal Court on Israel’s U.S.-backed crimes, which cannot be permitted judicial review for reasons that are all too obvious. A second concern, the New York Times reported, was that “the Palestinians might use the vote to seek membership in specialized agencies of the United Nations,” which could lead Washington to defund these international organizations, as it cut off financing to UNESCO in 2011 when it dared to admit Palestine as a member. The Master does not tolerate disobedience. [6]

Israel had warned that it would “go crazy” (“yishtagea”) if the resolution passed, reviving warnings from the 1950s that it would “go crazy” if crossed — not very meaningful then, much more so now. [7] And indeed, hours after the UN vote Israel announced its decision to carry forward settlement in Area E1 that connects the vastly expanded Greater Jerusalem that it annexed illegally to the town of Ma’aleh Adumim, greatly expanded under Clinton after the Oslo Accords, with lands extending virtually to Jericho, effectively bisecting the West Bank if the Area E1 corridor is closed by settlement. [8] Before Obama, US presidents had barred Israel’s efforts to expand its illegal settlements into the E1 region, so it was compelled to resort to stealth measures, like establishing a police station in the zone. Obama has been more supportive of Israeli criminal actions than his predecessors, and it remains to be seen whether he will keep to a tap on the wrist with a wink, as before.

Israel and the US insist on “direct negotiations” as the only “path to peace.” They also insist on crucial preconditions. First, the negotiations must be under US leadership, which makes as much sense as asking Iran to mediate Sunni-Shiite conflicts in Iraq. Genuine negotiations would take place under the auspices of some neutral party with a claim to international respect, perhaps Brazil, and would have the US and Israel on one side of the table, and most of the rest of the world on the other. A second precondition, left tacit, is that expansion of Israel’s settlements must be allowed to continue in one or another form (as happened, for example, during the formal 10-month “suspension”), with Washington signaling its disapproval while continuing to provide the required support.

The call for “direct negotiations” without substance is an old Israeli tactic to prevent steps towards diplomatic settlement that would impede its expansionist projects. After the 1967 war, the respected diplomat Abba Eban, who was in charge of the effort, was highly praised by Golda Meir and other colleagues in the governing Labor Party for his success at the United Nations in carrying forward “Israel’s peacemaking strategy” of confusion and delay, which came to “take the shape of a consistent foreign policy of deception,” as it is described by Israeli scholar Avi Raz in a detailed review of internal records. [9] At that time the tactics angered US officials, who protested vigorously though to no effect. But much has changed since, particularly since Kissinger took control of policy and the US largely departed from the world on Israel-Palestine.

The practice of delay goes back to the earliest Zionist settlement, which sought to “create facts” on the ground while keeping goals obscure. Even the call for a “Jewish commonwealth” was not made officially by the Zionist organization until a May 1942 meeting at the Biltmore hotel in New York.

Returning to Gaza, one element of the unremitting torture of its people is Israel’s “buffer zone” within Gaza from which Gazans are barred entry, almost half of Gaza’s limited arable land according to Sara Roy, the leading academic scholar of Gaza. From September 2005, after Israel transferred its settlers to other parts of the occupied territories, to September 2012, Israeli security forces killed 213 Palestinians in the zone, including 154 who were not taking part in hostilities, 17 of them children. [10]

From January 2012 to the launching of Israel’s latest killing spree on November 14, Operation Pillar of Defense, one Israeli was reported to have been killed by fire from Gaza while 78 Palestinians were killed by Israel fire. [11]

The full story is naturally more complex, and considerably uglier.

The first act of Operation Pillar of Defense was to murder Ahmed Jabari. Aluf Benn, editor of Ha’aretz, describes him as Israel’s “subcontractor” and “border guard” in Gaza, who enforced relative quiet in Gaza for over five years. [12] The pretext for the assassination was that during these five years Jabari had been creating a Hamas military force, with missiles from Iran. [13] Plainly, if that is true it was not learned on November 14.

A more credible reason was provided by Israeli peace activist Gershon Baskin, who had been involved in direct negotiations with Jabari for years, including plans for the release of the captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Baskin reports that hours before Jabari was assassinated, “he received the draft of a permanent truce agreement with Israel, which included mechanisms for maintaining the ceasefire in the case of a flare-up between Israel and the factions in the Gaza Strip.” A truce was then in place, called by Hamas on November 12. Israel apparently exploited the truce, Reuters reports, directing attention to the Syrian border in the hope that Hamas leaders would relax their guard and be easier to assassinate. [14]

Throughout these years, Gaza has been kept on a level of bare survival, imprisoned by land, sea and air. On the eve of the latest attack, the UN reported that 40 percent of essential drugs and more than half of essential medical items were out of stock. [15] One of the first of the series of hideous photos that were sent from Gaza in November showed a doctor holding the charred corpse of a murdered child. That one had a personal resonance. The doctor is the director and head of surgery at Khan Yunis hospital, which I had visited a few weeks earlier. In writing about the trip I reported his passionate appeal for desperately needed simple drugs and surgical equipment. These are among the crimes of the US-Israeli siege, and Egyptian complicity.

The casualty rates from the November episode were about normal: over 160 Palestinian dead, including many children, and 6 Israelis. Among the dead were three journalists. The official Israeli justification was that “The targets are people who have relevance to terror activity.” Reporting the “execution” in the New York Times, David Carr observes that “it has come to this: killing members of the news media can be justified by a phrase as amorphous as ‘relevance to terror activity’.” [16]

The massive destruction was all in Gaza. Israel used advanced US military equipment for the slaughter and destruction, and relied on US diplomatic support, including the usual US intervention to block a Security Council call for a cease-fire. [17]

With each such exploit Israel’s global image erodes. The images of terror and destruction, and the character of the conflict, leave few remaining shreds of credibility to the self-declared “most moral army in the world,” at least among people with eyes open.

The pretexts for the assault were also the usual ones. We can put aside the predictable declarations of the perpetrators in Israel and Washington, but even decent people ask what Israel should do when attacked by a barrage of missiles. It’s a fair question, and there are straightforward answers.

One response would be to observe international law, which allows the use of force without Security Council authorization in exactly one case: in self-defense after informing the Security Council of an armed attack, until the Council acts (UN Charter, Article 51). Israel understands that well. That is the course it followed at the outbreak of the June 1967 war, but of course Israel’s appeal went nowhere when it was quickly ascertained that it was Israel that had launched the attack. Israel did not follow this course in November, knowing well what would be revealed in a Security Council debate.

Another narrow response would be to agree to a truce, as appeared quite possible before the operation was launched on November 14, as often before.

There are more far-reaching responses. By coincidence, one illustration is discussed in the current issue of the journal National Interest. The authors, Asia scholars Raffaello Pantucci and Alexandros Petersen, describe China’s reaction after rioting in western Xinjiang province “in which mobs of Uighurs marched around the city beating hapless Han [Chinese] to death.” Chinese president Hu Jintao quickly flew to the province to take charge, senior leaders in the security establishment were fired, and a wide range of development projects were undertaken to address underlying causes of the unrest. [18]

In Gaza too a civilized reaction is possible. The US and Israel could end the merciless unremitting assault and open the borders, and provide for reconstruction — and if it were imaginable, reparations for decades of violence and repression.

The cease-fire agreement stated that the measures to implement the end of the siege and the targeting of residents in border areas “shall be dealt with after 24 hours from the start of the ceasefire.” There is no sign of steps in this direction. Nor is there any indication of US-Israeli willingness to rescind their policy of separating Gaza from the West Bank in violation of the Oslo Accords, to end the illegal settlement and development programs in the West Bank designed to undermine a political settlement, or in any other way to abandon the rejectionism of the past decades.

Some day, and it must be soon, the world will respond to the plea issued by the distinguished Gazan human rights lawyer Raji Sourani while the bombs were once again raining down on defenseless civilians in Gaza: “We demand justice and accountability. We dream of a normal life, in freedom and dignity.” [19]

Notes

[1] http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-war-between-israel-and-hamas-has-its-roots-in-britains-shameful-betrayal-of-the-palestinians-8327052.html.

[2] Avi Raz, The Bride and the Dowry (Yale, 2012).

[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/world/middleeast/leader-of-hamas-calls-for-palestinian-unity.html?src=twrhp.

[4] Slater, International Security, Nov-Dec 2012. http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2012/11/israel-and-palestinians.

[5] http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11317.doc.htm.

[6] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/world/middleeast/us-and-israel-look-to-limit-impact-of-palestinian-authority-upgrade.html.

[7] Barak Ravid, Ha’aretz, Oct. 26, under the headline “Yisrael Mazhira et Ha-Olam: Ba’al Habayit Yishtagea” (“Israel warns the world: the head of the household will go crazy”). http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1850595.

[8] http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/israel/index.html.

[9] Raz, op. cit.

[10] Roy, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/11/23/roy/sctFniw6Wn2n9nTdxZ91RJ/story.html?s_campaign=8315. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/24/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-conflict.html?ref=global-home.

[11] Ibid.

[12] http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-killed-its-subcontractor-in-gaza.premium-1.477886.

[13] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/world/middleeast/arms-with-long-reach-bolster-hamas.html?_r=0.

[14] http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israeli-peace-activist-hamas-leader-jabari-killed-amid-talks-on-long-term-truce.premium-1.478085. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/who-started-the-israel-gaza-conflict/265374/. http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2012/11/15/world/middleeast/15reuters-palestinians-israel-deception.html?scp=5&sq=bronner+Jaabari&st=nyt.

[15] Mads Gilbert, 11-17-12.

[16] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/business/media/using-war-as-cover-to-target-journalists.html?_r=0.

[17] http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/11/20/us-blocks-un-security-council-call-for-gaza-cease-fire-as-unbalanced-against/.

[18] http://nationalinterest.org/article/chinas-inadvertent-empire-7615.

[19] http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/11/20121117115136211403.html.

Russia and China: New horizons for cooperation

Ahead of his visit to China,Vladimir Putin wrote an article about cooperation between the two nations in the fields of economics, energy and international security. The article was published by the Chinese daily Renmin Ribao.

I am pleased to have this opportunity on the eve of my state visit to China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit to address the millions of readers of one of the world’s most influential newspapers, Renmin Ribao. I value this chance to share my views on the future of our countries’ partnership and the role Russian-Chinese relations play in today’s world, which is in the midst of complex transformation, faces big global and regional security challenges, attempts to dilute the principles of international law, and economic and financial upheaval.  

All of these issues are the subject of much discussion and attention at the big international forums and summits that take place, and I am confident that reason and collective approaches will prevail in tackling today’s problems. The main thing is that all clear-headed politicians and experts in economics and international relations realise that it is not possible to set the global agenda today behind Russia’s and China’s backs and without taking their interests into account. Such is the geopolitical reality of the twenty-first century.

In this context, we are aware of our common responsibility for the Russian-Chinese partnership’s long-term development and the importance of our common efforts within the United Nations and other multilateral organisations and regional bodies.   

We therefore have high hopes for the intensive programme of meetings we have planned with the Chinese leadership, and we also hope for fruitful work at the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit that will conclude China’s successful presidency of this organisation.

‘Russian-Chinese relations free from prejudices and stereotypes’

Russian-Chinese relations have been deservedly called an example of the new type of relations between states. Our relations are free from prejudices and stereotypes and this makes them stable and not subject to short-term considerations, which is valuable indeed in today’s world, where stability and mutual trust are so clearly lacking.  

The 2008-2009 global financial crisis showed us how important it is for us to understand and listen to each other and pursue common, consensus-based policies. Joint infrastructure and energy projects, big contracts and orders, and reciprocal investment are the resources that enabled our countries and our business communities to overcome the difficulties, create new jobs, and keep factories and businesses working.

Russian-Chinese bilateral trade reached the record mark of $83.5 billion in 2011. We have now set the medium-term target of $100 billion by 2015, and will work towards reaching $200 billion by 2020. If we keep up today’s dynamic, we will be able to reach these targets even earlier.  

What must we do to achieve these goals? Above all, we need to optimise our bilateral trade structure and improve its quality by increasing the share of high value-added goods. We have the objective conditions we need for this. Our national markets have big capacity and growing demand for modern goods and services. We have good fundamental positions in education, science and technology, and a wealth of experience in production cooperation. 

We will actively develop big joint projects in civilian aircraft manufacturing, space, and other high-tech sectors. We will also pursue projects in techno-parks, industrial clusters, and special economic zones in both countries. In my view, what we need here is a genuine technological alliance between our two countries, a genuine interweaving of our production and innovation chains so as to forge the links between our companies and our research, design, and engineering centres. We need to continue these efforts by working together in other countries’ markets too.

We need to build a modern infrastructure for our financial and investment ties and our bilateral business relations. It is clear now that we must make quicker progress in moving over to using our national currencies to settle reciprocal trade, investment and other operations. This will also insure us against various currency risks and will strengthen the ruble and the yuan’s positions.

The energy-sector dialogue between our two countries also has a strategic dimension. Our joint projects have a big impact in shaping the global energy market’s entire configuration. They offer China more reliable and diversified energy supplies for its domestic needs, and offer Russia the chance to open up new export routes to the fast-growing Asia-Pacific region.

Among the results already attained, I note the launch of the Russian-Chinese oil pipeline that delivered 15 million tons of oil last year, and the conclusion of a long-term contract – 25 years – for electricity supplies to China. Russia also increased its coal exports to China to 10.5 million tons in 2011, and have plans for joint development of coal deposits. I hope that we will soon begin large-scale deliveries of Russian gas to China.

Our cooperation in the nuclear energy sector also offers many opportunities. Russia took part in building the first section of the Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant, which the stress tests results show to be the safest in China. Last year, our specialists helped to launch China’s first fast-neutron experimental reactor, thus making China the fourth country, after Russia, Japan and France, to possess this technology. Construction of the fourth section of a uranium enrichment plant was completed ahead of schedule. We hope to continue our cooperation on building the Tianwan power plant’s second and subsequent sections, and to take part in building other energy sector facilities in China.   

The source and driving force of our relations is the friendship and mutual understanding between our peoples. We held very successful reciprocal national years and language years. Now we are holding the Year of Russian Tourism in China, and next year our attention will be on the Chinese Tourism Year in Russia.

I think the time is ripe for us to draw up a long-term action plan for developing our bilateral cooperation in the humanitarian sphere.

‘Russian-Chinese partnership plays effective part in strengthening stability’

Naturally, current international affairs will be on the upcoming visit’s agenda. They include strategic stability, disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and countering the threats and challenges to sustainable development, and our peoples’ lives and wellbeing, including terrorism, separatism, organised crime, and illegal migration. 

Russia and China share very similar positions on all of these issues, positions based on the principles of responsibility, commitment to the basic values of international law, and unconditional mutual respect for each other’s interests. This makes it easy for us to find a common language, develop common tactics and strategies, and make a constructive contribution to international discussions on the most serious issues we face today, whether the situation in the Middle East and North Africa, the problems in Syria and Afghanistan, or the Korean Peninsula and Iranian nuclear programme issues.

I stress that the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership plays an effective part in strengthening regional and global stability. This is our guiding logic in our efforts to develop cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which marked its tenth anniversary last year.  

I was one of the people at the origins of this group. Time has shown that we made the right decision in transforming the Shanghai Five into a full-fledged cooperation organisation.

The SCO today is a rapidly-developing multilateral organisation. We have yet to realise its full potential, but looking back at the road travelled so far, we can say for sure that the organisation has already earned itself an influential place and speaks with a confident voice on the international stage. 

The SCO has brought much that is new and useful to global politics. Above all, it offers a partnership model based on genuine equality between all participants, mutual trust, mutual respect for each people’s sovereign and independent choice, and for each country’s culture, values, traditions, and desire for common development. This philosophy best embodies what I consider to be the only viable principles for international relations in a multipolar world.

The SCO and its members’ efforts and cooperation with a broad range of foreign partners have been highly instrumental in substantially reducing terrorist activity in the region. But the challenges we face today are becoming ever more diverse, complex, and change constantly. Those who spread the ideas of terrorism, separatism and extremism continue to perfect their subversive methods, recruit new fighters to their ranks, and expand their financing sources. 

To respond to these challenges we must continue to develop the SCO’s capacity to ensure security and make our cooperation mechanisms even more effective. This is why the upcoming summit will pay particular attention to approving the 2013-2015 SCO member states’ programme for cooperation in combating terrorism, separatism and extremism, and the new draft provisions on political and diplomatic measures and response mechanisms in situations that threaten peace, security and stability in the region.

The links between terrorism, drugs production, and drugs trafficking are another serious challenge. We must work together in coordinated fashion to combat this. We must develop this cooperation most actively through the SCO’s anti-drugs strategy.  

The situation in Afghanistan is one of our common concerns. The SCO is making a big contribution to helping the Afghan people in rebuilding their long-suffering country. The decision to grant Afghanistan observer status in the SCO will be another concrete step that we will take at the upcoming summit. We will discuss the prospects for joint work within the SCO with Afghanistan’s leader, Hamid Karzai.

The SCO was established as an organisation tasked with ensuring stability and security across the vast Eurasian continent. We think that any attempts by other countries to pursue unilateral action in the SCO’s region of responsibility would be counterproductive.

At the same time, the SCO is an open organisation that is ready to work together with all interested partners. This is stated in the SCO’s charter. India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan are all involved in the SCO as observer countries. Belarus and Sri Lanka are SCO dialogue partners. Turkey will join us at this upcoming summit. Given the growing interest in the SCO’s activities, we are currently settling how to strengthen the legal basis for the organisation’s continued enlargement.

The SCO’s experience offers interesting and very promising solutions for the entire international community in terms of developing policies from below through a consensus-based process. Policies take shape within the different regional organisations first of all, and then become part of the dialogue between us all. Out of these regional ‘building blocks’ we can put together a more stable and predictable environment for global politics and the global economy. 

We think that this kind of network diplomacy will become a vital part of international relations. The SCO member states saw this trend in the making and have acted on it by developing a network of partnerships between multilateral organisations throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Today, the SCO is working hard to develop cooperation with the UN, CIS, CSTO, EurAsEC, ASEAN, ESCAP, and other international bodies.  

We see great potential in developing cooperation between the SCO and the Eurasian Economic Community, and in the future, with the Eurasian Economic Union. I am sure that these organisations can mutually enrich and effectively complement each other in their work.

There is no doubt that we must strengthen political cooperation within the SCO and step up our economic cooperation. The organisation is up to the task of implementing even the biggest joint projects. It would be in our common interests to make use of the obvious advantages offered by China’s fast-growing economy, the technological potential that Russia is developing as it modernises, and the Central Asian countries’ rich natural resources. I think we should concentrate particularly on cooperation in the energy, transport, infrastructure, and agriculture sectors, and in the high-tech fields, especially in information and telecommunications technology. 

But this requires us to put in place genuinely effective financial support and project management mechanisms within the SCO. We need platforms for developing joint plans, places for assembling multilateral programmes. The SCO energy club, which we have almost finished establishing now, could serve as a good example in this respect.

Much of the SCO’s future development potential lies in developing direct ties between our countries’ business communities and companies. I am sure that the business forum in Beijing during the summit will demonstrate the broad range of opportunities for public-private partnerships in expanding our economic cooperation. It is important to actively involve our countries’ industrial and banking sectors in carrying out the plans we set. All of this requires more effective and intensive work from the SCO Business Council and Interbank Group. They already have quite a solid package of proposals.

It is also in our common interests to develop cooperation in healthcare, culture, sports, education, and science. The opportunities in these fields are most convincingly embodied in the Network University, one of the SCO’s most striking initiatives, which now brings together 65 different universities in the SCO member countries. The university will have its rector’s offices in Moscow. We are ready to do all we can to help develop this very promising and much-needed project.  

As it enters its second decade, the SCO continues to grow and develop. It will hold firm in its work to its guiding principles and basic goals, and at the same time will continue to take account of the changing international situation. This is the approach that will be reflected in the basic agreement we are set to discuss and adopt at the summit – the Basic Guidelines for the SCO Medium-Term Development Strategy.  

‘Russia needs prosperous China; China needs successful Russia’

We have high hopes for the Russian-Chinese talks and the SCO summit in Beijing. Russia needs a prosperous China, and I am sure that China needs a successful Russia. Our partnership is not directed against anyone, but is about construction and strengthening justice and the democratic foundations in international life. This partnership is thus something needed in today’s world.

An old Chinese saying states that common hopes require common efforts. We are ready for these common efforts in the interests of our countries and peoples. This work will certainly produce worthy results.